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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which were enacted to address the potentially immense burden involved in 
the discovery of electronically-stored information (“ESI”),1 set in motion a 
process that is revitalizing the primary purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure adopted nearly seventy years earlier: “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”2  
One of the principal means through which the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure achieve this purpose is by allowing for the discovery of “any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”3  
The reasoning behind these liberal discovery rules is that once parties 
know, ostensibly through discovery, their respective positions in a dispute, 
they will reach a resolution more quickly and efficiently.4 
  
                                                
1 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf 
[hereinafter 2005 COMM. REPORT]; Letter from David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., to John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, 
Supreme Court of the U.S. (Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1105/Summary_Proposed_Amendments.pdf 
[hereinafter Summary of Proposed Amendments]; see also Damian Vargas, Note, 
Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 34 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 396 (2008). 
 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  Although Rule 1 has changed since its enactment in 1938, it has 
continuously embraced the same core principles.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory 
committee’s note. 
 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also O'Meara-Sterling v. Mitchell, 299 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 
1962) (“The spirit and purpose of the Federal Rules is to secure just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of actions and they look to the admission of matters about 
which there is no dispute.”); Des Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955) (“The 
rules have for their primary purpose the securing of speedy and inexpensive justice in a 
uniform and well ordered manner.”). 
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[2] However, unbounded liberal discovery in the modern information 
age can carry immense burdens.5  Increasing ubiquitous use of computers 
through the later half of the twentieth century, and the consequent 
digitization of information, has created an unfathomable volume of 
information, and will continue to do so at an exponential rate.6  These 
technological advancements allow us to store as much information on a 
single server as is contained in every item in the Library of Congress7 
(147,093,357 at last count).8   
   
[3] The creation of more information means there is more available, 
and potentially relevant, information to a party’s claim or defense, and 
thus more information subject to discovery.9  Moreover, the discovery 
norms that developed during the paper era are unsuited to the new 
paradigm of e-mail, backup tapes, and server farms.10  As such, a broadly 
worded discovery request that would have resulted in the production of 
several thousand pages of paper documents in the late-1980s could easily 
result in the production of several million pages of ESI today, with a 
                                                
5 See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1; see also Bernadette Starzee, Law’s Double-
Edged Sword of Technology, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS, Jan. 12, 2011, available at 2011 
WLNR 1175529.  
 
6 See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System 
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 10-13 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/ 
article10.pdf; Bennett B. Borden, E-Discovery Alert, The Demise of Linear Review, 
CLEARWELL SYSTEMS, 1 (Oct. 2010), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-
blog/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/E-Discovery_10-05-2010_Linear-Review_1.pdf; see 
also Jason R. Baron & Ralph C. Losey, e-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 
11, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M&feature=player_ 
embedded.  
 
7 See Data, Data Everywhere: A Special Report on Managing Information, ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 27, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.unitysystems.biz/downloads/ 
TooMuchInformation_Laserfiche.pdf. 
 
8 About the Library, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/generalinfo.html#2007 
_at_a_glance (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 
9 See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23; see also Baron & Losey, supra note 6. 
 
10 See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.  
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corresponding increase in the cost of conducting such discovery.11  The 
immense volume of potentially relevant evidence has driven the cost of 
finding, reviewing, and producing that information to unprecedented 
heights, threatening the very purposes of our civil justice system.12 
  
[4] The volume of information responsive to an “all documents 
concerning (anything)” request may be utterly impossible to manage, 
forcing litigants to develop more artful and articulate discovery 
strategies.13  The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (the “2006 Amendments” or “Amendments”), have provided 
the legal framework for developing these new strategies, and an analysis 
of court opinions issued since the Amendments reveals that both the bench 
and the bar are getting better at doing so.14  Although seemingly modest in 
                                                
11 See John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564-70 (2010) (discussing how electronic discovery has 
increased the costs and volume of material associated with discovery). 
 
12 See John Bace, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew Justice System, A KERSHAW, 1-
3 (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.akershaw.com/Documents/cost_of_ediscovery_threatens_ 
148170.pdf. 
 
13 See Bradley C. Nahrstadt, A Primer on Electronic Discovery: What You Don't Know 
Can Really Hurt You, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Fall 2008, at 17, 26-27 (discussing the difficulty 
associated with electronically stored information requests, which can result in the 
requestor receiving too little or too much, information); Kenneth R. Berman & David A. 
Brown, Practical Issues in Framing and Responding to Discovery Requests for 
Electronic Information, in AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., NAT’L 
INST., REPRESENTING HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES: BUSINESS LAW, LITIGATION, 
TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE 1-2 (1998)  (“Broad discovery requests for electronic 
information can . . . generate objections and expensive discovery disputes, which might 
be avoided by more thoughtful, narrowly tailored requests for electronic information . . . . 
[T]he sheer mass of information potentially available, and the cost of reviewing, 
organizing, and interpreting such information counsel in favor of specificity in discovery 
requests for electronic information.”). 
14 See, e.g., Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676, 680, 684-85 (N.D. Ga. 2010) 
(noting the Magistrate Judge’s role in developing a discovery protocol and finding she 
appropriately narrowed the plaintiff’s electronic discovery requests); see also Pension 
Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 
456, 463-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (identifying spoliation and sanction issues stemming from 
electronic discovery); Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, Inc., No. 
2:05-cv-01059-KJD-GWF, 2007 WL 1726558, *6-11 (D. Nev. June 11, 2007) (limiting 
the scope of discovery requests). 
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scope, these Amendments set the stage for a paradigmatic shift in the ways 
both courts and litigants approach the electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) 
process in particular, and the litigation process in general.  By requiring 
parties to gain an understanding of their own information, engage each 
other about ESI early in the litigation process, and involve the courts to 
help balance the parties’ rights and burdens with respect to such discovery, 
the 2006 Amendments have fostered a more cooperative, just, and 
efficient approach to discovery that has begun to revitalize the guiding 
principle in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1.15   
  
[5] This Article examines how the landscape of electronic discovery 
has changed in the four years since the adoption of the 2006 Amendments.  
It first describes the substance, structure, and purpose of the 2006 
Amendments.  Next, the Article examines how the 2006 Amendments 
have influenced, affected, and changed the way we go about conducting 
electronic discovery by fostering greater cooperation between adversaries 
and more efficient methods of requesting, searching for, and producing 
information.  This Article then looks to the technological changes on the 
horizon that will require our legal system to further adapt, including the 
growing prevalence of social media and the changing nature of privacy in 
our information age.   
 
II.  THE 2006 ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS  
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
[6] On December 1, 2006, amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 went into effect to address, largely for 
the first time, the issue of discovery of ESI.16  The Advisory Committee 
began considering the Amendments in the late 1990s as ESI became a 
more frequent subject of discovery disputes.17  The Advisory Committee 
                                                
15 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The 
Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J., 215, 216-18 (2009). 
 
16 Supreme Court of the United States, Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure ¶ 3, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see also W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 
F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Mass. 2007). 
17 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.  
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solicited extensive input from “bar organizations, attorneys, computer 
specialists, and members of the public” in the early-2000s and, in 2005, 
introduced the proposals that eventually became the 2006 Amendments.18  
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the United States Supreme Court 
provided final approval for the Amendments in April 2006 and, following 
no further action from Congress, the changes went into effect.19    
  
[7] By the time the Advisory Committee first introduced the proposals 
that would result in the 2006 Amendments, the legal community was 
struggling with the pitfalls and complexities of e-discovery.20  In fact, 
nearly five years earlier, a previous iteration of the Advisory Committee 
had explicitly recognized the need to address the growing issue of 
electronic discovery through amendments to the discovery rules.21  Before 
the Amendments, courts were dealing with the complexities and burdens 
of e-discovery through the use of local rules and case law, which led to 
inconsistencies across jurisdictions and a confusing and debilitating 
federal civil judicial system.22  For example, in 2002 the Southern District 
                                                
18 Id. 
 
19 Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Dick 
Cheney, President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; Letter from John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, 
House of Representatives (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court 
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of 
evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before 
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).  
 
20 See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-24; see also Tom Olzak, eDiscovery 
Challenges, INFOSECWRITERS (Feb. 2006), http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources 
/pdf/eDiscovery_TOlzak.pdf. 
 
21 Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to 
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/repcivil.pdf (“The 
Committee recognized that it will be faced with the task of devising mechanisms for 
providing full disclosure in a context where potential access to information is virtually 
unlimited and in which full discovery could involve burdens far beyond anything justified 
by the interests of the parties to the litigation.”). 
 
22 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
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of New York, in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 
adopted a test to determine whether to shift the costs of e-discovery 
between the parties,23 only to modify and replace that test less than 
eighteen months later in the seminal Zubulake I opinion.24   
  
[8] Against this backdrop, the Advisory Committee first proposed the 
Amendments “to reduce the costs of [electronic] discovery, to increase its 
efficiency, to increase uniformity of practice, and to encourage the 
judiciary to participate more actively in case management.”25  The 
Amendments made the following substantive changes to the discovery 
rules:  
 
• Rule 16(b) was amended to allow the district court to 
include in a scheduling order “provisions for disclosure or 
discovery of electronically stored information” and “any 
agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of 
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material after 
production;”26   
                                                
23 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(adopting a multi-factor test to determine cost-shifting in e-discovery). 
 
24 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (identifying 
Rowe as “the gold standard for courts resolving electronic discovery disputes” but 
modifying the Rowe test by eliminating two factors and adopting a new seven-factor test 
to govern cost-shifting for electronic discovery). 
 
25 Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
(May 27, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm]. 
 
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (2006); see Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra 
note 25, at 26-27, 29.  The language, but not the substance, of Rule 16 has since been 
amended to read, “provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored 
information;” and “any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or 
protection as trial-preparation material after information is produced.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
16(b) (emphasis added). 
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• Rule 26(a)(1)(B) – now Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) – was 
amended to include ESI in the list of information that 
parties must include in their initial disclosures;27 
 
• Rule 26(b)(2)(B) was amended to allow a party to withhold 
discoverable material stored in a manner that is “not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” 
subject to the opposing party’s right to file a motion to 
compel the disclosure of such material;28  
 
• Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was amended to require a party, upon 
receiving notice that information produced in discovery is 
privileged, to “promptly return, sequester, or destroy the 
specified information and any copies it has;”29  
 
• Rule 26(f) was amended to identify three additional items 
for parties to discuss when meeting to formulate a 
discovery plan: (1) preservation of discoverable 
information, (2) issues related to the disclosure or 
discovery of ESI, and (3) agreements regarding the 
handling of claims that information requested or disclosed 
in discovery is privileged or subject to work product 
protection;30 
 
• Rule 33(d) was amended to allow a party to produce ESI in 
lieu of a written response to an interrogatory if the burden 
                                                
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (2006); Report of the 
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 30.   
 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (2006); Report of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 46, 52. 
 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (2006); Report of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 56-58, 61-62.  
 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 31-33, 38-39.  
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in deriving the answer to the interrogatory from the ESI 
would be substantially the same for both parties;31 
 
• Rule 34(a) was amended to include ESI within the 
information a party can seek in discovery under this rule, 
and provides a party the ability to sample or test ESI;32 
 
• Rule 34(b) was amended to allow a requesting party to 
specify the form in which it seeks production of 
information requested in discovery;33  
 
• Rule 37(f) was amended to create a safe-harbor from 
sanctions for a party who deletes information as part of a 
routine information management system;34 
 
• Rule 45 was amended to contain language to conform to 
the changes made to the rules listed above for discovery 
from third parties.35 
  
[9] Taken together, these changes established a general framework for 
parties to use when a case involves the discovery of ESI, and there are 
very few cases that do not.36  Fundamentally, the Amendments require a 
                                                
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d); see FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 68-69.  
 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 70-73, 80-82.  
 
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b); see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 71-72, 80-81. 
 
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (2006); see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 86, 89-90. 
 
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 45; see FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (2006); Report of the Civil Rules Advisory 
Comm., supra note 25, at 92-102, 106-09. 
 
36 See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and 
Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 11, ¶ 2 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article11.pdf; Todd Mayo, Helpful 
Tips for Electronic Document Management in Construction Litigation, CONSTRUCTION 
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party to consider and discuss relevant ESI much earlier in a case than 
before.37  Prior to the Amendments, parties often did not think about 
discovery until after the filing of a complaint, followed by an answer and a 
motion to dismiss.38  The Amendments changed the timing of when parties 
need to consider ESI by requiring the disclosure of ESI in initial 
disclosures under Rule 26.39  These disclosures must occur within 14 days 
of a Rule 26(f) conference,40 at which the parties are to discuss a discovery 
plan, the scope of preservation, the form of production, protective orders, 
and privilege protections.41  In fact, if the parties do not cooperatively 
participate in forming a discovery plan, the court may sanction them under 
Rule 37(f).42  Furthermore, the Rule 26(f) conference must occur before 
the Rule 16(b) scheduling order,43 which generally takes place within 120 
                                                                                                                     
UPDATE (PinnacleOne, Arnhem, Neth.), Aug. 2007, available at 
http://www.lorman.com/newsletter/article.php?article_id=795&newsletter_id=174&categ
ory_id=3&topic=CN (“Electronic documents have become so prevalent that they are now 
recognized as a standard part of the discovery process.  This, along with the fact that 
parties are increasingly turning their paper documents into electronic form, demonstrates 
that the love for paper in litigation is slowly fading.  We may never be paperless, but we 
will surely find ourselves more frequently in situations where we must decide how to 
efficiently manage electronic documents.”). 
37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (requiring parties to discuss e-
discovery at their discovery-planning conference and explaining that doing so can help 
avoid later difficulties); see also Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-
Volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 532 (2009) (“The belief that lawyers 
should, if not must, significantly increase their early efforts in order to properly address 
the demands of e-discovery seems nearly universal.”). 
 
38 Cf. Gensler, supra note 37, at 524 (“Despite the centrality of discovery to the Federal 
Rules system, the 1938 Rules contained virtually nothing about discovery management, 
either by the parties through planning discussions or by the court.”). 
 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1). 
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days from the filing of the complaint.44  The scheduling order 
contemplates the inclusion of a discovery protocol, which, when used to 
its full advantage, should include specific agreements by the parties 
concerning the scope, format, and timing of the production of ESI.45  For 
the scheduling order to include all of these aspects, the parties must 
undertake sufficient efforts to understand their own sources of ESI, and 
what ESI they need from the opposing party.46  
  
[10] The real genius behind the Amendments is that, when properly 
used, the responsibility rests upon the parties to consider the evidence they 
need, where it is located, and how to acquire it in a way that is fair and 
proportional to the needs of the case.47  A party cannot disclose sources of 
ESI until it identifies those sources.48  Therefore, a party must undertake 
some analysis of its ESI soon after the initiation of a case.49  A party 
cannot meet and confer regarding the proper scope of discovery unless it 
has some idea of where relevant information resides and the burden 
required to retrieve it.50  The fundamental solution to conducting civil 
discovery in a world awash in information is to seek only the information 
                                                
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2). 
 
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B). 
 
46 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (noting that it might be beneficial 
for parties and counsel to discuss their computer information systems when developing a 
discovery plan); see also Gensler, supra note 37, at 532 (discussing the importance of 
knowing both your client’s and opponent’s information system before litigation). 
 
47 See Gensler, supra note 37, at 532. 
 
48 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 
49 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (discussing the importance of 
counsel familiarizing itself with computer and other information systems that potentially 
store ESI). 
 
50 Cf. Mazza et al., supra note 36, ¶ 139 (explaining that a party who knows the location 
of ESI, why the party needs the ESI, and how much it will cost to access, is “in the best 
position to persuade a court to shift some or all discovery costs). 
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that is necessary for the resolution of the case.51  To do this, litigants must 
openly and transparently discuss sources of information, how to address 
them, and the associated level of difficulty.52  The Amendments provide 
the tools to allow such dialogue to occur.  
  
[11] An examination of e-discovery opinions issued since the 
Amendments reveals that the bench and bar are increasingly adept at using 
the tools the Amendments provide to craft discovery protocols that are 
reasonable, iterative, and proportional to the needs of the case.53  This 
newfound proficiency is finally helping achieve the primary goal of civil 
litigation: “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”54   
 
III. HOW THE 2006 AMENDMENTS HAVE CHANGED  
THE DISCOVERY PROCESS 
 
[12] From a textual perspective, the 2006 Amendments made relatively 
modest changes to the discovery rules aimed at modernizing the process to 
accommodate the explosion of ESI.55  From the addition of “electronically 
stored information” to Rule 34(a), to the requirement that parties discuss 
e-discovery when formulating a discovery plan under Rule 26(f), to the 
direction for courts to consider e-discovery when entering a scheduling 
                                                
51 See Scott E. Randolph & A. Dean Bennett, Using the Mandatory Rule 26(f) Discovery 
Conference to Manage ESI Pays Dividends Throughout Litigation, IDAHO EMP. L. BLOG 
(Feb. 7, 2011, 10:19 AM), http://www.idahoemploymentlawblog.com/2011/02/using-the-
mandatory-rule-26f-discovery-conference-to-manage-esi-pays-dividends-throughout-
litigation.html.  
 
52 See Gensler, supra note 37, at 532. 
 
53 See Bennett B. Borden et al., Alert: Sanctions Down; Cooperation Up; Preservation, 
Privacy and Social Media Remain Challenging, WILLIAMS MULLEN (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.williamsmullen.com/sanctions-down-cooperation-up-preservation-privacy-
and-social-media-remain-challenging-12-17-2010/.  
 
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.   
55 See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23 (noting the differences between 
conventional discovery and ESI discovery and concluding: “These and other difference 
are causing problems in discovery that rule amendments can helpfully address.”). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 3 
 
 13 
order under Rule 16(b), the 2006 Amendments largely consisted of 
seemingly small changes to the discovery rules that made the e-discovery 
process more uniform and certain.56   
  
[13] However, the modesty of the textual changes the Amendments 
effected belies the breadth of the impact they have had since adoption, 
especially considering how many courts have subsequently enforced the 
Amendments.57  At their most fundamental, the Amendments have created 
the opportunity, indeed the requirement when properly enforced, for 
litigants to consciously consider the evidentiary needs of their case, 
understand how those needs can be satisfied by ESI, communicate those 
needs to opposing counsel and the court, and negotiate and implement 
reasonable and proportional strategies to identify and produce ESI.58  
When carefully considered and consciously undertaken, artful e-discovery 
strategies can significantly decrease the burden of e-discovery and lead to 
the speedy, just, and inexpensive resolution of civil litigation.59 
  
[14] In fact, this is where “information inflation” is a good thing.  By 
2002, the amount of data maintained on computers reached 5 exabytes (5 
billion gigabytes), which is roughly the equivalent of every word spoken 
by human kind.60  By 2009, “there were about 988 exabytes of data,” an 
amount of data that, if printed, would reach from the sun to Pluto and 
back.61  This volume of information is so immense that it is 
                                                
56 See id., supra note 1, at 26, 28.  
57 See, e.g., In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. Mass. 2008); Bd. of 
Regents v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492, at *17-18 (D. 
Neb. Nov. 5, 2007); Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2009 WL 
790203, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2009). 
 
58 See Paul & Baron, supra note 6, ¶ 35. 
59 See Kenneth W. Brothers, Six Key Lessons from Living with the E-Discovery 
Rules, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. 18979, at 331-34 
(March, 2009). 
 
60 Baron & Losey, supra note 6; Borden, supra note 6, at 1.  
61 Borden, supra note 6, at 1; Baron & Losey, supra note 6. 
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incomprehensible.  However, even more astounding than the mere volume 
of information is the uses to which we put it.  The information age has 
fundamentally affected virtually every aspect of our society, and has 
ushered in “a new phase of civilization.”62  So, why is this a good thing for 
the resolution of litigation? 
  
[15] The typical person goes about her day creating a great deal of 
information, a digital contrail, if you will.  Much of that information is 
electronically created and stored.63  Between e-mail, instant messages, 
texts, posts, tweets, blogs, phone call records, voicemail, pictures, GPS-
interactive application data, logins, downloads, server logs, records of 
security “key card” swipes, ATM cards, credit cards, and automatic toll 
booth payment systems, the volume and variety of data the typical person 
creates every day is astounding.64  Perhaps more importantly, this digital 
contrail is evidence of where a person was at a particular point in time, 
what they did there, and very often, why they did it.65  The typical 
litigation matter, at its most fundamental, seeks to answer those very 
questions: “What happened, and why?”  In our modern information age, 
the answers to these questions are contained largely, and increasingly, 
within ESI. 
  
[16] Simply knowing that the answers to the questions “what happened 
and why” may lie somewhere within a vast repository of ESI does not 
prove particularly helpful to litigants.  Litigants must specifically target 
the ESI that is legally significant to the outcome of the matter.66  The 2006 
                                                
62 Paul & Baron, supra note 6, ¶ 9. 
 
63 See Baron & Losey, supra note 6 (“98% of all information is created electronically.”). 
 
64 See Paul & Baron, supra note 6, ¶ 21. 
 
65 See Apu Kapadia et al., Virtual Walls: Protecting Digital Privacy in Pervasive 
Environments, 4480 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 162 (2007), available at: 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a651245g33k62p72/fulltext.pdf. (advocating 
employment of “virtual walls” in the computer science field to prevent release of “digital 
footprint” information, because third parties may be able to extrapolate unintended data 
via “context-aware applications”). 
 
66 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also In re Subpoena to Michael Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 
118 (1st Cir. 2008)  (“Rule 26(b)(1) allows discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is 
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Amendments have helped litigants focus on these key questions by 
establishing a framework through which they can consciously consider 
and disclose sources of potentially relevant ESI, and work with opposing 
counsel to target reasonably and proportionally those sources to develop 
legally significant facts.67  This cooperative approach to discovery is what 
the Amendments (and especially the case law interpreting them) are 
largely about.68   
  
A.  Cooperation 
 
[17] The complexities and costs associated with electronic discovery 
require that parties cooperate to prevent the process from devolving into 
mutually assured destruction.69  Much of the consternation surrounding 
electronic discovery has resulted from the fact that parties adopting bare-
knuckled approaches to discovery in the age of ESI have driven the cost of 
litigation beyond all reasonable bounds.70  Parties who approach electronic 
discovery in this fashion often find themselves facing legal discovery bills 
that exceed the underlying amount in controversy and come to dominate 
                                                                                                                     
relevant to any party's claim or defense.’  A party seeking broader discovery ‘of any 
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,’ is required to show good 
cause to support the request.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). 
 
67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED R. CIV. P. 34(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory 
committee’s note; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (describing 
“electronically stored information” as a flexible and broad term).     
  
68 See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co, 253 F.R.D. 354, 362 (D. Md. 2008) 
(“However central the adversary system is to our way of formal dispute resolution, there 
is nothing inherent in it that precludes cooperation between the parties and their attorneys 
during the litigation process to achieve orderly and cost effective discovery of the 
competing facts on which the system depends.”). 
 
69 See Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for 
Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 474 
(2010). 
 
70 See id.; see also Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2009 WL 
790203, at *21 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2009). 
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the litigation.71  However, when parties approach e-discovery in a more 
cooperative fashion with regard to issues such as the scope of the duty to 
preserve,72 the search protocols the parties will use for ESI,73 and the form 
in which the parties will produce ESI,74 can reduce the transaction costs 
associated with the mechanics of the process and prevent discovery from 
consuming the litigation.75  It is not e-discovery per se that drives 
litigation costs, it is e-discovery conducted incompetently.76 
  
[18] The critical structural changes made by the 2006 Amendments to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 have fostered greater cooperation 
between litigants involved in e-discovery.77  These changes do not 
mandate cooperation where the rules previously required none, but rather 
                                                
71 See Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 
2004) (“[D]espite the best efforts of Congress, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
and other similar bodies, litigation expenses continue to rise, often due to ever-increasing 
discovery demands and ensuing discovery disputes.”). 
 
72 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing 
the scope of the duty to preserve). 
 
73 See Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL 763668, 
at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (advising parties to meet and confer on the use of a search 
protocol, including keywords); The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best 
Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-
Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 200-01 (2007).  
 
74 See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep't of Homeland 
Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[C]ourts have emphasized the need for the 
parties to confer and reach agreements regarding the form of electronic document 
production before seeking to involve the court.”); Sedona Conference Best Practices 
Commentary, supra note 73. 
   
75 Cf. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co, 253 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Md. 2008).  
 
76 See id. at 359. 
 
77 See Emery G. Lee III & Kenneth J. Withers, Survey of United States Magistrate Judges 
on the Effectiveness of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 
SEDONA CONF. J., 201, 207 (2010) (finding that 70.5% of surveyed magistrate judges 
thought the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was “at least somewhat effective in 
encouraging [cooperation]”). 
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set the stage for cooperation to occur.78  For instance, by designating 
electronic discovery as a topic for parties to address when formulating a 
discovery plan, Rule 26(f)(3)(C) now requires the parties to begin 
discussing e-discovery issues at an early stage of the litigation.79  The rule 
does not compel the parties to reach agreement on any issue they discuss, 
or even to discuss any particular issue.80  Rather, Rule 26(f)(3)(C) simply 
requires the parties to talk to one another about e-discovery before 
discovery begins.81  
 
[19] The disputes that had become common were a driving force behind 
the Advisory Committee’s desire to have parties pursue this goal.82  For 
example, before the 2006 Amendments took effect, parties routinely 
                                                
78 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 
79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C). 
 
80 See id.  
 
81 See id.  The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26(f) provides:   
 
The particular issues regarding electronically stored 
information that deserve attention during the discovery planning stage 
depend on the specifics of the given case.  For example, the parties may 
specify the topics for such discovery and the time period for which 
discovery will be sought.  They may identify the various sources of 
such information within a party's control that should be searched for 
electronically stored information.  They may discuss whether the 
information is reasonably accessible to the party that has it, including 
the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the information.  Rule 
26(f)(3) explicitly directs the parties to discuss the form or forms in 
which electronically stored information might be produced.  The parties 
may be able to reach agreement on the forms of production, making 
discovery more efficient. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (citations omitted). 
 
82 See, e.g., DE Techs., Inc. v. Dell Inc., 238 F.R.D. 561, 565-66 (W.D. Va. 2006); N. 
Natural Gas Co. v. Teksystems Global Applications, Outsourcing, L.L.C., No. 8:05 CV 
316, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64149, *7-10 (D. Neb. Sept. 6, 2006); In re Priceline.com 
Inc., Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 88, 89 (D. Conn. 2005); Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. 
Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. 2005); In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 
JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22467, *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004). 
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fought over the form in which to produce ESI, particularly with respect to 
the production of metadata.83  As a result, the Advisory Committee 
specifically identified the form of production as an issue that parties 
should discuss during the meet-and-confer in order to identify disputes 
early and “avoid the expense and delay of searches or productions using 
inappropriate forms.”84 
  
[20] This new focus on fostering engagement and cooperation between 
parties appears throughout the changes to Rule 26.85  For example, Rule 
26(b)(2) was designed as a protective measure “to address issues raised by 
difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some 
electronically stored information.”86  On its face, the rule does not appear 
to require any type of cooperative engagement between parties and, 
instead, actually empowers a party responding to discovery to withhold 
discoverable information by unilaterally designating it as “not reasonably 
accessible.”87  This rule would actually appear to encourage mischief by 
empowering parties to resist discovery on nothing more than a self-serving 
determination that specific information is “not reasonably accessible.”88 
                                                
83 See DE Techs., 238 F.R.D. at 565-66 (discussing the form in which electronic data 
would be produced); N. Natural Gas Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64149, at *7-10 
(requiring the plaintiffs to produce the software at issue in a form the defendant could 
use); In re Priceline.com, 233 F.R.D. at 89 (discussing the defendants’ objection to the 
manner in which electronic information should be produced); Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 
649 (discussing the limited guidance provided by Rule 34 with respect to the form in 
which electronic documents must be produced); In re Verisign, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22467, at *7-8 (addressing the defendants’ objections to the production of documents in 
electronic form). 
 
84 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 
85 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 
87 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 
88 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-
DJS, 2007 WL 496716, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2007) (finding the information subject 
to a discovery request “not reasonably accessible” and thereby denying defendants’ 
motion to compel).   
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[21] However, the Advisory Committee balanced this new power of 
potential obstruction by imposing upon the responding party the burden of 
demonstrating that the information is not reasonably accessible, and 
authorizing the court to order production even if the responding party is 
able to meet its burden.89  Therefore, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) created more of a 
“qualified privilege” than an absolute safe-harbor.90  Furthermore, by 
using the threat of a motion to compel to limit the power of the responding 
party to resist discovery,91 the Advisory Committee created a scenario 
under which parties must engage one another and seek a remedy to the 
dispute before seeking judicial resolution.92  This is significant given that 
Rule 37(a) requires that a party make a good faith effort to resolve a 
discovery dispute before filing a motion to compel.93  Indeed, commentary 
on the rule makes clear both that a party resisting discovery under the rule 
must provide sufficient facts about the information it is withholding, for 
the requesting party to evaluate its claims, and that the parties should 
discuss the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the information 
before proceeding further.94 
 
[22] Since the 2006 Amendments took effect, the underlying concept of 
cooperation has taken firm hold within the judiciary.95  Courts have come 
                                                
89 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“On motion to compel discovery . . . the party from whom 
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because 
of undue burden or cost.  If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order 
discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause . . . .”); see also 
Tangent, eDiscovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Instant 
Message Archiving, DATACOVE, 3, http://www.datacove.net/docs/frcp_26_dc_im.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
 
90 See Jeffrey W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule 26(B)(1) in 
Litigation: The New Scope of Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 419 (2001); Tangent, supra 
note 89 at 4. 
 
91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 
92 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A); see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 
94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 
95 See Gensler, supra note 37, at 538-40. 
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to view the e-discovery process as “a cooperative undertaking, not part of 
the adversarial give and take,”96 and they routinely order parties to 
cooperate when conducting discovery of ESI.97  In fact, courts have held 
that attorneys now have an affirmative duty to cooperate in discovery and 
confer with one another to resolve any disputes that may arise,98 and have 
explicitly ordered parties to cooperate on forming a search protocol to 
govern electronic discovery.99  Due to this increased emphasis on 
cooperation, courts are paying closer attention to parties’ efforts to resolve 
e-discovery disputes before seeking judicial relief.100  Courts routinely 
decline to rule on discovery disputes where, in the opinion of the 
respective court, the parties have not put forth sufficient effort to resolve 
their differences prior to seeking resolution from the court.101  
  
                                                
96 In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 660 (M.D. Fla. 2007).  
 
97 See Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *10 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 29, 2010) (ordering parties to meet and confer about search terms); see also Ross v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 2:05-cv-0819, 2010 WL 1957802, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 
14, 2010) (ordering parties to meet and confer, and devise search protocol). 
 
98 See Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 571 (D. Md. 2010); Mancia v. 
Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357–58 (D. Md. 2008); Bd. of Regents v. 
BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492, at *17-18 (D. Neb. Nov. 
5, 2007) (holding that the 2006 Amendments “placed--on counsel--the affirmative duties 
to work with clients to . . . cooperatively plan discovery with opposing counsel . . . and 
confer with opposing counsel to resolve disputes . . . .”). 
 
99 See Dunkin' Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., No. CV 2007-
4027(ENV)(MDG), 2009 WL 1750348, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009). 
 
100 Cf. Gensler, supra note 37, at 566.  
 
101  See, e.g., Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that, under amended Rule 
26(f)(3)(C), “at the outset of any litigation, the parties should discuss whether the 
production of metadata is appropriate and attempt to resolve the issue without court 
intervention”); Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 
1723509, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007) (deferring ruling on a motion to compel 
production of metadata until after the parties conducted meet and confer because “[i]t 
[was] unclear to th[e] Court whether the parties ha[d] fully exhausted extra-judicial 
efforts to resolve th[e] dispute”). 
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[23] In large part, parties have responded positively to these 
developments.102  Since 2006, cases involving e-discovery have revealed a 
variety of different areas in which parties have used cooperative 
agreements to avoid many of the burdens and costs associated with ESI.103  
Parties now routinely reach agreements on such issues as the form in 
which ESI will be produced, which search terms will be used, which 
groups of custodians will have their ESI searched, what ESI will be 
sampled before broader searches are conducted, and various other aspects 
of search protocols.104  In recent years, parties have also begun to 
negotiate agreements to define each party’s duty to preserve ESI, thereby 
reducing the uncertainty that often surrounds the question of what a party 
needs to preserve once litigation arises or is anticipated.105   
  
[24] One striking example of the extent to which this new cooperative 
ethos has been adopted is a series of cases in which parties of vastly 
different resource levels entered cooperative agreements on e-discovery.106  
From a purely adversarial perspective, an imbalance in litigation resources 
of this type weighs strongly against cooperation for the party with the 
greater resources.107  Indeed, historically, many parties have viewed 
resource imbalances of this type as a key strategic weapon to force the 
opposition to drop their case or enter into an unfavorable settlement.108  
                                                
102 See, e.g., Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *8 (providing an example of defendants 
using Rule 37 to compel a plaintiff to provide documents and the plaintiff complying). 
 
103 See, e.g., Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 WL 
4884397 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009); Capitol Recs., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418 (D.N.J. 
2009); Newman v. Borders, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 
104 See, e.g., Widevine Techs., 2009 WL 4884397, at *1. 
 
105 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 417 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 
106 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103. 
 
107 See Beisner, supra note 11, at 563 (explaining how one party can force settlement by 
driving up its opponent’s discovery costs). 
 
108 See id. at 551. 
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However, when the party with the greater resources is a corporation, it 
also tends to have more information that is electronic and discoverable, 
and thus it potentially faces greater expense in the discovery process.  This 
has done much to balance the respective resources of the parties in 
asymmetric litigation and is one of the factors driving the extent to which 
the 2006 Amendments have taken hold.109  
  
[25] But, it would be naïve to suggest that this cooperative approach to 
e-discovery is universally accepted or applied.110  In a number of recent 
decisions, courts have denied motions to compel because the information 
sought was outside of an agreement reached between the parties.111  
Moreover, one of the only reasons that courts continue to stress the need 
for cooperation is that the parties involved in those lawsuits were 
displaying sufficient levels of uncooperative behavior to merit a response 
from the court.112  However, since the enactment of the 2006 
Amendments, the clear trend has been toward greater levels of cooperation 
between parties.113 
  
                                                
109 Cf. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“More 
important than comparing the relative ability of a party to pay for discovery, the focus 
should be on the total cost of production as compared to the resources available to each 
party.  Thus, discovery that would be too expensive for one defendant to bear would be a 
drop in the bucket for another.”).  
 
110 See, e.g., Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 WL 
4884397, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009) (denying a motion to compel the production of 
documents outside of the date range agreed by the parties even though the documents 
might be responsive). 
 
111 See id.; see also In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 5:07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 WL 
260954, at *1, 4 (E.D. Ky. Feb 2, 2009) (denying a motion to compel the production of 
documents in a format different from the one agreed to by the parties). 
 
112 See generally cases cited supra note 103. 
 
113 Cf. Thomas Y. Allman, Managing E-Discovery After the 2006 and 2008 Amendments: 
The Second Wave, in 804 PRACTISING LAW INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES, LITIG., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2009: WHAT CORPORATE 
AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW 129, 134 (2009) (“Some courts explicitly require 
both cooperation and civility.”) (emphasis in original). 
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[26] One example of this trend is the 2008 The Sedona Conference 
Cooperation Proclamation.114  Building on the cooperative mandate of the 
2006 Amendments, the Cooperation Proclamation reflects an effort by 
The Sedona Conference to promote “a culture of cooperation in the 
discovery process,” and encourage “a national drive to promote open and 
forthright information sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, 
and the development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative, 
collaborative, transparent discovery.”115  Only three pages in length, the 
Cooperation Proclamation sets forth general principles designed to 
achieve these goals and guide the manner in which parties approach 
discovery.116  The cooperative approach to e-discovery advocated in the 
Cooperation Proclamation has enjoyed overwhelming acceptance.117  
  
[27] Since 2008, courts have repeatedly looked to, relied on, and 
encouraged parties to act consistently with the Cooperation Proclamation 
when addressing e-discovery issues.118  For example, after becoming 
exasperated with a series of discovery disputes over issues as petty as 
whether a party could file a reply brief, Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer of 
the District of Colorado ordered the parties “to work together consistent 
                                                
114 See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation 
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (Supp. 2009).  
 
115 Id. at 331. 
 
116 See generally id at 331-33. 
 
117 Id. at 334-38 (listing all of the judges who support the Cooperation Proclamation). 
 
118 See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *10 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (citing Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-
01644-REB-CBS, 2010 WL 502721, at *13-14 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (ordering the 
parties “to actively engage in cooperative discussions to facilitate a logical discovery 
flow.”); Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Trumble, No. 09-cv-00964-WYD-CBS, 2010 WL 
1435382, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 9, 2010) (quoting Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 
112, at 331) (stating that counsel “‘bear a professional obligation to conduct discovery in 
a diligent and candid manner’”); SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (directing “the parties' attention to the recently issued Sedona 
Conference Cooperation Proclamation” and its recognition “that courts see the discovery 
rules ‘as a mandate for counsel to act cooperatively’”) (citation omitted). 
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with . . . the principles underlying The Cooperation Proclamation.”119  
Some courts have gone significantly further than simply citing the 
Cooperation Proclamation and have substantively relied on it to resolve 
discovery disputes.120   
 
[28] Although the Cooperation Proclamation is most closely associated 
with the field of e-discovery, its impact has extended beyond such narrow 
confines.121  In JSR Micro, Inc. v. QBE Insurance Corp., the court cited 
the Cooperation Proclamation when resolving the plaintiff’s motion to 
address the defendant’s violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
30(b)(6).122  In response to the plaintiff’s request to depose a corporate 
representative under Rule 30(b)(6), the defendant contended that it was 
unable to identify an appropriate representative for two of the designated 
topics because the language the plaintiff used was “too ambiguous.”123  
The court found this assertion unpersuasive and, citing the Cooperation 
Proclamation, stated that the defendant “should have met and conferred 
with Plaintiff to clarify the meaning” of the language in question, rather 
than “unilaterally assum[ing] a narrow interpretation” thereof.124   
  
[29] The 2006 Amendments created the framework through which 
parties can discuss openly and cooperatively the evidentiary needs of a 
case and how fairly and reasonably to satisfy them.125  Litigants are 
increasingly taking advantage of this framework, and when they do not, 
                                                
119 Cartel Asset Mgmt., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *41. 
 
120 See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 363-64 (D. Md. 
2008). 
 
121 See, e.g., JSR Micro, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. C-09-03044 PJH (EDL), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 40185, at *9-11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010). 
 
122 Id. at *10. 
 
123 Id. 
 
124 Id. 
 
125 See Allman, supra note 111, at 133 (“The 2006 Amendments were designed . . . to 
promote open and forthright sharing of information to expedite case progress, minimize 
burden and expense and remove contentiousness as much as possible.”). 
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courts often step in to see that they do.126  This cooperative approach to e-
discovery is perhaps the single most important impact the 2006 
Amendments have had on the discovery process.  
 
B.  Proportionality 
 
[30] Closely related to the idea of cooperation, is the idea of 
proportionality.127  The 2006 Amendments not only encourage parties to 
cooperate so they understand the sources and contents of ESI, but the 
Amendments also established an explicit mechanism to confine the 
discovery of ESI to that which is most useful to the resolution of the 
controversy.128  The Amendments acknowledge that in our modern age we 
are deluged with information, but not all information relevant to a case is 
necessary for that case’s speedy, just, and inexpensive resolution.129  
Instead, the Amendments contemplate that the information subject to 
discovery should be the information that is reasonably accessible, taking 
                                                
126 See, e.g., Degeer v. Gillis, No. 09 C 6974, 2010 WL 5096563, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 
2010) (ordering a non-party to meet and confer with the defendants to determine search 
terms that would lead to responsive documents); Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 
96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Thus, counsel are generally directed to meet and confer to 
work in a cooperative, rather than an adversarial manner, to resolve discovery issues.”); 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 48 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“As I 
indicated during a conference with counsel . . . if such disputes persist, I will ‘require that 
all meet and confers be in person and that they be videotaped.’”); see also Thomas Y. 
Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 
13, ¶ 1 (2006), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v12i4/article13.pdf (“[The Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] also establish a new paradigm of mandatory early 
discussion of contentious issues, including preservation of potentially discoverable 
information.”). 
 
127 See Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (“Nevertheless, the Rule 26 proportionality test allows the Court to 
‘limit discovery if it determines that the burden of the discovery outweighs its benefit.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
 
128 See Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - A 
Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, ¶ 
1 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/ v13i3/article12.pdf. 
 
129 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
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into account the needs of the case.130  Rule 26 plays a large part in 
effectuating such a limitation.131   
  
[31] The text of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is straightforward and authorizes a 
party to withhold production of ESI that is “not reasonably accessible,” 
subject to the requesting party’s right to compel production of the 
withheld data.132  The Advisory Committee adopted factors similar to the 
proportionality test identified in Zubulake I to provide guidance to courts 
when determining whether to compel production of ESI withheld under 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B).133  Specifically, a requesting party can only compel 
production of ESI that is “not reasonably accessible” if it can justify the 
need for such ESI under the circumstances of the case and the specific 
nature of the discovery request.134  However, the most significant aspects 
of the Advisory Committee’s commentary on Rule 26(b)(2) are found in 
the following directives: 
 
In [some] cases, the parties may need some focused 
discovery, which may include sampling of the sources, to 
learn more about what burdens and costs are involved in 
accessing the information, what the information consists of, 
and how valuable it is for the litigation in light of 
information that can be obtained by exhausting other 
opportunities for discovery. 
 
                                                
130 See id. 
 
131 See generally id. (outlining the ways in which parties can work together and with 
courts under Rule 26 to ensure that e-discovery is generally limited to materials that are 
reasonably accessible and relevant to the litigation). 
 
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 
133 Compare Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(creating a “New Seven-Factor Test” to be used when considering cost-shifting of 
discovery costs between parties), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c) advisory committee’s 
note (incorporating the “New Seven-Factor Test” from Zubulake into the 2006 
Amendments). 
 
134 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
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 The good-cause inquiry and consideration of the 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitations are coupled with the authority 
to set conditions for discovery.  The conditions may take 
the form of limits on the amount, type, or sources of 
information required to be accessed and produced.135 
 
[32] These two directives, in conjunction with the text of Rule 
26(b)(2)(B), have given parties and courts an explicit legal basis to employ 
proportional approaches to electronic discovery.136  Although there is no 
single definition that captures the number of possible permutations of such 
proportional approaches, the basic goal is to find ways to take an 
undifferentiated mass of ESI and determine whether and to what extent it 
contains information relevant to the litigation, and/or what retrieval 
methods will work best to obtain that information.137  Such approaches 
take greater levels of forethought and planning, but have the ability to 
reduce dramatically the scope and costs of e-discovery.138 
  
[33] In fact, Rule 26(g)(1) explicitly requires lawyers to undertake this 
level of foresight and planning.139  Rule 26(g)(1) requires that a lawyer 
sign every discovery request, and by doing so, attest that the request is 
“neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering 
the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in 
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.”140   
  
                                                
135 Id. 
 
136 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory 
committee’s note. 
   
137 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.   
 
138 See generally id. (discussing the primary purposes of the 2006 Amendment, which 
requires parties to plan their discovery carefully and consider costs of discovery before 
engaging in e-discovery). 
 
139 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).  
 
140 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).  
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[34] Courts increasingly rely on Rule 26 to confine discovery to that 
which is proportional to the needs of the case.  In some cases, courts have 
simply denied a party’s request for e-discovery where the burden clearly 
outweighed the potential benefit of the information sought.141  In other 
cases, courts have narrowed the scope of e-discovery to that which is 
justified by the facts of the case.142  For example, in Calixto v. Watson 
Bowman Acme Corp., the court confronted the plaintiff’s motion to 
compel the defendant to restore all of its backup tapes to a searchable 
format and then search each for relevant ESI.143  The court, however, 
found such a request too burdensome for the benefit it would yield and 
instead ordered the defendant to restore and search a single backup tape.144   
  
[35] Further, courts have increasingly imposed limits on the scope of 
ESI search protocols parties propose.145  For example, in Barrera v. 
Boughton, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for production of ESI 
from forty custodians over a six-year period and instead ordered 
production of ESI from only three custodians over a three-year period.146  
Similarly, in Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., the court rejected a requesting 
party’s proposal for an ESI search spanning fifty-five custodians over a 
three-year period using fifty search terms and instead allowed the 
producing party to use the narrower search protocol it proposed.147   
                                                
141 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 
2010) (denying a motion to compel production of three years worth of e-mails on grounds 
that "the ESI requested [was] not reasonably accessible because of the undue burden and 
cost"). 
 
142 See, e.g., Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-CIV-
ZLOCH/ROSENBAUM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111659, at *30-35 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 
2009). 
 
143 Id. at *31. 
 
144 Id. at *35-36. 
 
145 See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103491, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010); Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676, 
684-85 (N.D. Ga. 2009).  
 
146 See Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12. 
 
147 See Edelen, 265 F.R.D. at 684-85. 
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[36] Courts are also becoming increasingly facile with the use of 
iterative search techniques and sampling to identify the most effective and 
proportional search protocol for ESI.148  In Barrera, the court ordered a 
phased approach to e-discovery under which the defendant would sample 
the ESI from the three custodians over the three-year period and, 
depending on the results, the plaintiff would then have the opportunity to 
request additional searches.149  Although not ruling under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in Makrakis v. DeMelis, the court allowed a 
party seeking ESI from thirteen custodians over a twenty-two year period 
to obtain an initial sampling of ESI from backup tapes and determine 
whether a broader search was justified.150  Recent improvements in 
advanced search technologies, sampling, and computer-assisted review (or 
predictive coding) have made this type of phased approach a viable option 
for many litigants.151 
  
[37] Following closely on the heels of its Cooperation Proclamation, 
The Sedona Conference issued The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery (the “Commentary on 
Proportionality”) in October 2010.152  The Commentary on 
Proportionality adopted six broad principles to govern the process of 
electronic discovery: 
 
1. The burdens and costs of preservation of potentially 
relevant information should be weighed against the 
potential value and uniqueness of the information when 
determining the appropriate scope of preservation. 
 
                                                
148 See, e.g., Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12; Makrakis v. DeMelis, No. 
09-706-C, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *6-7 (Super. Ct. July 13, 2010). 
 
149 See Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491 at *12. 
 
150 Makrakis, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *7. 
 
151 See, e.g., Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12; Makrakis, 2010 Mass. 
Super. LEXIS 223, at *7. 
 
152 The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11 
SEDONA CONF. J. 289 (2010) [hereinafter Commentary on Proportionality]. 
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2. Discovery should generally be obtained from the most 
convenient, least burdensome, and least expensive 
sources. 
 
3. Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a 
party’s action or inaction should be weighed against 
that party. 
 
4. Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the 
analysis of whether requested discovery is sufficiently 
important to warrant the potential burden or expense of 
its production. 
 
5. Nonmonetary factors should be considered when 
evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery. 
 
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be 
considered in the proportionality analysis.153     
 
[38] The Sedona Conference designed the Commentary on 
Proportionality to function as a guide for practitioners and courts when 
confronting specific electronic discovery issues.154  The Commentary on 
Proportionality identified the specific legal rules and doctrines that 
provide the basis for proportionality in e-discovery, and provided direct 
guidance for best practices under each principle.155  Although The Sedona 
Conference published the Commentary on Proportionality less than four 
months before the composition of this Article, two courts have already 
cited the document favorably when addressing e-discovery issues.156  
                                                
153 Id. at 291. 
 
154 See id. at 290 (“We hope our efforts will assist lawyers, judges, and others involved in 
the legal system work with the concept of proportionality in discovery.”). 
 
155 See generally id. 
 
156 See FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 10-149 (EGS/JMF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115205, at *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2010); see also Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010). 
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[39] The twin principles of cooperation and proportionality codified in 
the 2006 Amendments and increasingly enforced by the courts are 
immensely powerful tools for decreasing the burden of e-discovery in the 
information age.157  Moreover, as can be seen through the e-discovery 
opinions issued since the 2006 Amendments, these principles are starting 
to have an effect on the conduct of civil litigation.158  This effect can be 
seen best through an examination of e-discovery sanctions cases. 
 
C.  Sanctions 
 
[40] Although drawing a substantial amount of attention in the legal 
press, the issue of sanctions did not figure prominently in the 2006 
Amendments.159  The only change that the Advisory Committee made in 
the area of sanctions was the addition of the so-called “safe harbor” 
provision under what was then Rule 37(f).160  Under this new rule, “absent 
exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of 
electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system.”161   
 
[41] The scope and effect of this safe harbor provision is limited.162  
The need for the rule grew out of the Advisory Committee’s recognition 
that “[m]any steps essential to computer operation may alter or destroy 
information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information 
                                                
157 Indeed, the Advisory Committee expected and intended this trend.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
26 advisory committee’s note (“The information explosion of recent decades has greatly 
increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for 
discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”). 
 
158 See e.g., Tamburo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7; FTC, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 115205, at *11. 
 
159 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note.   
 
160 Under the current version of the Code, the safe harbor provision is found under Rule 
37(e).  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 
161 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 
162 See id. 
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might relate to litigation.”163  However, this safe harbor provision does not 
override a party’s duty to preserve evidence once litigation begins or is 
reasonably anticipated.164  As a result, Rule 37(f)–now Rule 37(e)–has not 
fundamentally changed the availability or scope of sanctions in the e-
discovery context.165 
  
[42] Although the 2006 Amendments in general and the safe harbor 
provision in particular had little direct effect on the issue of e-discovery 
sanctions, the framework for e-discovery the Amendments created, as well 
as the experience that both parties and courts have gained with e-
discovery, have had a significant impact on the number and types of 
sanctions awarded by courts, as well as the circumstances in which 
sanctions are awarded.166  The number of e-discovery cases where a party 
requested and the court granted sanctions increased each year after 2006, 
reaching their peak in 2009.167   
  
[43] However, the relative number of cases where courts awarded 
sanctions decreased in 2010 for the first time since the 2006 
Amendments.168  Courts issued 280 e-discovery opinions169 in 2010.170  Of 
                                                
163 Id.  
 
164 See id. 
 
165 See id. 
 
166 See 2009 Year-End Electronic Discovery and Information Law Update, GIBSON DUNN 
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2009YearEndElectronic 
DiscoveryUpdate.aspx.  
 
167 See id. 
 
168 See Borden et al., supra note 53.  
 
169 Deciding whether an opinion is an “e-discovery opinion” is a subjective 
determination.  Opinions from criminal cases are not e-discovery opinions because they 
are not subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Similarly, opinions involving 
general discovery matters, though they incidentally involve the discovery of ESI, are not 
e-discovery opinions. 
 
170 Cf. Borden et al., supra note 53 (identifying and discussing trends in the 209 e-
discovery opinions published as of December 1, 2010).   
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 3 
 
 33 
those opinions, 79 involved cases where a party sought sanctions (38%) 
and the court awarded sanctions in 49 of those cases (62% of the cases 
where a party sought sanctions and 23% of all 2010 e-discovery cases).171  
This is a significant decrease from 2009, when a party pursued sanctions 
in 42% of e-discovery cases, and the court awarded sanctions in 70% of 
those cases (30% of all e-discovery cases).172  There was also a 
corresponding relative decline in every type of sanction awarded, 
including fees and costs (twenty-nine cases), adverse inferences (seven 
cases), terminating sanctions (seven cases), preclusion of evidence (three 
cases), and additional discovery ordered (six cases).173   
  
[44] To a large extent, the decline in sanctions can be explained by the 
growing sophistication of parties and courts in dealing with e-discovery 
issues.174  As previously discussed, the 2006 Amendments provided a 
framework for the conduct of e-discovery and guidance on the relevant 
issues for parties and courts to address.175  Parties and their attorneys have 
also developed much greater familiarity and experience with electronic 
discovery.176   
 
[45] Indeed, as reflected by developments such as preservation orders 
and the growing reliance on proportional approaches to e-discovery, 
parties and courts are actively working to prevent the circumstances that 
generate sanctionable conduct.177  As a result, we see fewer cases in which 
the court sanctions a party, particularly a sophisticated party, for failing to 
                                                
171 Id. 
 
172 Id. 
 
173 Id. 
 
174 See id. 
 
175 See supra notes 67, 125-26 and accompanying text. 
 
176 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 
177 See, e.g., Tamburo 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) 
(citing The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289, 294 (2010)). 
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preserve relevant evidence,178 failing to conduct a proper search of ESI,179 
actively destroying ESI during litigation,180 or withholding ESI from 
production without justification.181  Although such sanctionable conduct 
certainly continues to occur, its prevalence has diminished.  
 
IV.  CHALLENGES THAT REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED 
 
A.  Preservation Obligations 
 
[46] Violation of the duty to preserve discoverable evidence remains 
one of the most difficult problems litigants face and the most fertile area 
for sanctions.182  This is caused by two main challenges.  The first 
challenge concerns the ability of a litigant to know where its information 
is located and how to preserve it.183  This is fundamentally an information 
governance problem.184  Our ability to create information, coupled with 
                                                
178 Cf. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 
179 Cf. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 AI, 
2005 Extra LEXIS 94, at *1, 30 (Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty., Fla. Mar. 23, 2005). 
 
180 Cf. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 
181 Cf. Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 113 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 
182 See Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability 
of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006) (“While the case law has 
developed general guidelines as to when the duty exists and the scope of the duty, these 
guidelines are more difficult to follow when electronic information is involved.”); see 
also Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the 
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010) (“In the 230 cases in which sanctions were 
awarded, the most common misconduct was failure to preserve ESI, which was the sole 
basis for sanctions in ninety cases.”) (footnote omitted). 
 
183 See Ronald J. Hedges, Discovery of Digital Information, 747 PRACTISING L. 
INST./LITIG. 41, 56 (2006) (“Any discovery plan must address issues relating to [digital or 
electronic] information, including the search for it and its location, retrieval, form of 
production, inspection, preservation, and use at trial.”). 
 
184 See Barry Murphy, What is Information Governance?, EDISCOVERY J. (Mar. 22, 2010, 
7:00 AM), http://ediscoveryjournal.com/2010/03/what-is-information-governance/ (“For 
those of us in eDiscovery, information governance is about putting in place the right 
people, processes, and tools to be able to efficiently respond to requests for 
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the ease and inexpensive nature of storing it, has led to vast repositories of 
data.185  However, our ability to know what is in that information has not 
kept up with our ability to create it.186  This is compounded by the 
separation of the legal function of a company, which is responsible for 
preserving information, and the IT function, which is responsible for 
managing information and implementing the technological processes that 
effect its preservation.187  To solve this problem, a company must have a 
comprehensive information governance plan so that it knows what 
information it creates, where the information is located, and what the 
information contains.188  Although beyond the scope of this Article, the 
single most important thing a company can do to lower the burden 
associated with e-discovery is to implement an effective information 
governance plan that includes a litigation response protocol.189  This 
protocol should implement steps through which a company recognizes the 
triggering of the duty to preserve, evaluates the scope of the duty, and the 
proper manner in which to preserve the information.190 
                                                                                                                     
information.”).  Mr. Murphy’s posting also provides an excellent graphical depiction of 
what constitutes information governance.  See id. 
 
185 See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, No. 
05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (stating 
that this is “an era where vast amounts of electronic information is [sic] available”); Crist, 
supra note 182, at 9 (stating that “improvements in technology make information storage 
easier and cheaper in an electronic form”). 
 
186 Cf. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 259 n.5 (D. Md. 2008) 
(referring to “the extra challenges . . . posed by handling voluminous production of ESI”). 
 
187 See Harry Pugh, Information Governance: A Practical Approach for the Dodd-Frank 
Era, WALL ST. & TECH. (Feb. 16, 2011), http://wallstreetandtech.com/articles/229216570 
(“many companies lack any systematic linkage and transparency between IT and the 
people who determine the legal obligations and business value.”). 
 
188 Cf. id. (discussing information governance in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
noting the importance of companies “knowing what information they have and where it 
is”). 
 
189 See Maureen E. O’Neill et al., New E-Discovery Rules: How Companies Should 
Prepare, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 15-16 (2007). 
 
190 See id 
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[47] The second challenge is recognizing the circumstances that trigger 
the duty to preserve.  The general rule is that a duty to preserve is 
triggered once litigation becomes reasonably likely.191  For a defendant, 
this is usually, but certainly not always, when it is served with a 
complaint.192  For a plaintiff, it is at some point prior to filing its 
complaint, because it made the decision to undertake litigation before 
drafting the complaint.193  However, determining when the duty is 
triggered is increasingly tricky, as the 2010 cases reveal.194  The challenge 
for companies is to establish clear lines of communication between 
business units and the legal department so they can timely recognize 
triggering events and readily respond.195 
  
[48] Even with an effective information governance plan and protocols 
in place to recognize a triggering event, the preservation burden can be 
substantial.196  This is because there is very little guidance in the case law 
                                                
191 See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 521 (D. Md. 
2010) [hereinafter Victor Stanley II]; Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. 
Supp. 2d. 598, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan 
v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546, at *14-15 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 
192 See Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. 
Colo. 2007); Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., L.L.C., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, 
at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006). 
 
193 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (“A plaintiff’s duty is more often triggered 
before litigation commences, in large part because plaintiffs control the timing of 
litigation.”). 
 
194 See Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 516; Rimkus Consulting, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613; 
see also Crist, supra note 182, at 18 (“Courts are not in agreement as to when a party 
should be charged with sufficient notice of a claim to trigger the preservation 
obligation.”).  
 
195 See Murphy, supra note 184 (“Because eDiscovery initiatives are really part of 
information governance, they are closely related to records management, compliance, 
privacy, and security programs.  The challenge many organizations face is connecting 
these programs under one umbrella and correctly assigning ownership–sometimes to 
legal, sometimes to IT, and sometimes to compliance.”). 
 
196 Cf. Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 523 (noting that the only “safe” preservation 
policy is “one that complies with the most demanding requirements of the toughest court 
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and nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to help define the 
proper scope of preservation.197  In an insightful article entitled 
Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation 
Decisions, Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm and his co-authors discussed the 
difficulty in dealing with the duty to preserve, which is largely a common 
law duty, when litigation is reasonably likely.198  When the filing of a 
complaint triggers the duty to preserve, opposing counsel can be engaged 
to negotiate the proper scope of preservation, and the court can be 
involved as needed.199  In fact, the 2010 e-discovery cases show an 
increased use of preservation agreements negotiated by litigants.200  Yet, 
when a triggering event occurs before the filing of a complaint, a company 
is on its own to determine the proper scope of preservation, and mistakes 
in this determination can be costly, even outcome determinative.201  
  
[49] However, courts recognize the difficulty involved in preserving all 
potentially relevant evidence and often issue sanctions more on the basis 
of the prejudice suffered by the injured party and less on the culpability of 
                                                                                                                     
to have spoken on the issue, despite the fact that the highest standard may impose 
burdens and expenses that are far greater than what is required in most other 
jurisdictions”).  
 
197 See Allman, supra note 111, at 140 (stating that “[t]he Rules ‘do not specifically 
address’ preservation obligations” and “case law is not a model of clarity, especially in 
regard to its onset or ‘trigger’ of the duty [to preserve]”) (quoting Texas v. City of Frisco, 
No. 4:07cv383, 2008 WL 828055, *4 (E.D. Tex. Nev. Mar. 27, 2008)).  
 
198 See generally Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-
Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381 (2008). 
 
199 See id. at 393-99; cf. Crist, supra note 182, at 54-55 (discussing proactive steps a party 
can take to ensure the proper preservation of ESI). 
 
200 See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20207 (M.D. La. 2010). 
 
201 See Grimm et al., supra note 198, at 383; see also Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. 
Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (issuing monetary sanctions 
and entering a default judgment because the defendant destroyed records). 
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the spoliator.202  Reflecting this more pragmatic approach to sanctions, in 
recent years courts typically have chosen sanctions more remedial than 
punitive in nature.203  For example, one court entered an adverse inference 
sanction against a party that destroyed a relevant surveillance tape, even 
though the court found no evidence that the party did so intentionally.204  
Another court entered a similar sanction against a party that destroyed 
evidence because it was not aware of its duty to preserve.205  Although 
courts are increasingly focusing on the prejudice caused by sanctionable 
conduct, few courts hesitate to award substantial sanctions where a party’s 
conduct is indisputably egregious.206  One court entered sanctions of 
$100,000 against a defendant that fabricated critical e-mails.207  Another 
court dismissed a plaintiff’s case with prejudice for repeated and flagrant 
violations of the court’s discovery orders.208 
  
[50] The preservation obligation remains one of the most significant 
challenges in e-discovery.  In the coming years, courts likely will address 
this issue through the development of case law on the preservation 
obligation, the use of preservation agreements, and perhaps even further 
                                                
202 See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (“But even 
when conduct is less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the 
defendant is extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case.”). 
 
203 See, e.g., Kwon v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 08-00360 JMS/BMK, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13614, at *10 (D. Haw. Feb. 17, 2010) (issuing an adverse inference sanction 
even though the party destroying evidence “was on notice of [the] claim” but “took no 
steps to preserve the [evidence]”); Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20311, at *19-24 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2010);  
 
204 See Kwon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13614, at *8-10. 
 
205 See Melendres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20311, at *19–20 (holding that bad faith is not 
necessary to determine whether sanctions are appropriate). 
 
206 See, e.g., Aliki Foods, LLC v. Otter Valley Foods, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 159, 182 (D. 
Conn. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because it had “intentionally and 
deliberately” destroyed ESI it had been ordered to produce). 
 
207 See Amerisource Corp. v. RX USA Int’l Inc., No. 02-CV-2514 (JMA), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67108, at *17, *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2010). 
 
208 See Aliki Foods, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 182. 
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amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that better define the 
obligation and provide protections for good faith efforts to comply.  
 
B. Privacy, Social Media, and the Outdated Stored Communications Act 
 
[51] The decrease in cases where courts awarded sanctions in 2010, 
despite the increase in the number of e-discovery cases, reflects 
maturation on the part of the bench and the bar in dealing with the 
significant challenges of our information age.209  However, there remain 
new challenges that courts are just beginning to address.  These challenges 
relate to information created and used in ways entirely new to the 
information age, where there is very little law, and where analogies to the 
old ways of using information do not quite fit.   
  
[52] Although privacy issues have long vexed courts, litigants, and 
commentators in areas unrelated to e-discovery,210 2010 saw the issuance 
of a number of opinions that exemplify the uncertainty and inconsistency 
that surrounds the privacy of electronic communications.211  Many of 
these cases involved a situation where an employer used its control over 
the means by which an employee sent or received electronic 
communications to gain access to those communications.212   
                                                
209 See 2010 Year-End Electronic Discovery and Information Law Update, GIBSON DUNN 
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010YearEndE-
Discovery-InformationLawUpdate.aspx [hereinafter 2010 Year-End Update] (“In perhaps 
the most important development in the sanctions area, the overall frequency of courts 
granting sanctions declined substantially compared to 2009 . . . .”). 
 
210 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding a statute that makes it 
a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct in violation 
of the right to privacy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-95 (1986) (holding a 
state sodomy statute did not violate the rights of homosexuals), overruled by Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (holding a statute that 
permitted married persons to obtain contraceptives but prohibited distribution of 
contraceptives to single persons violated the Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (ruling a law that forbade the use of 
contraceptives was an unconstitutional intrusion on the right of marital privacy).  
 
211 See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010); 
People v. Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d 305, 311-12 (Crim. Ct. 2010).  
 
212 See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 307; Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 308. 
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[53] In People v. Klapper, a New York state court held that an 
employee had no inherent right of privacy in a personal e-mail account 
accessed through his employer’s computers.213  The employer used 
software that recorded all of the keystrokes made on a computer to obtain 
the login information for an employee’s personal e-mail account.214  The 
employer subsequently used information obtained through that software to 
access the employee’s personal e-mail account and obtain copies of her e-
mails.215  The court dismissed the charges against the employer and held 
that the employee had no personal right to privacy to personal e-mail 
stored on a computer owned by his employer because there was no 
unauthorized access.216  In so holding, the court suggested that once an 
employee types information into a computer, any expectation of privacy in 
such information is lost.217   
 
[54] In contrast with the Klapper decision, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, in Stengart v. Living Care Agency, Inc., held that an employee had 
a protectable privacy interest in communications sent through a personal 
e-mail account using her employer’s computer.218  In Stengart, the 
employee used her work computer to access a password-protected web-
based e-mail account and send e-mails to an attorney about the conditions 
at her workplace.219  After the employee resigned, the employer hired 
experts to analyze the computer, and these experts were able to retrieve 
some of the e-mails the employee sent to her attorney.220  Even though the 
                                                
213 See Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 311. 
 
214 Id. at 308.  
 
215 Id. 
 
216 Id. at 311. 
 
217 See id. at 307 (“It is today's reality that a reasonable expectation of internet privacy is 
lost, upon your affirmative keystroke.”). 
 
218 Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010). 
 
219 Id. at 656. 
 
220 Id. 
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employer had a written policy that all communications sent through its 
computer systems were subject to review,221 the court held that the 
employee had a right to privacy in her personal e-mail account, which 
trumped the company’s policy.222 
  
[55] Together, Klapper and Stengart exemplify the uncertainty 
surrounding the extent to which the law considers electronic 
communications private.223  Unfortunately, the United States Supreme 
Court recently passed up an opportunity to provide some much-needed 
direction in this area.224  In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court granted cert 
to review a decision by the Ninth Circuit that the City of Ontario, 
California violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining copies of text 
messages a City employee sent and received on a City issued electronic 
pager.225  However, the Court avoided the question of whether the 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages,226 
and instead, held that regardless of the employee’s expectation of privacy, 
the City’s conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.227  The 
Court stated: 
                                                
221 Id. at 657. 
 
222 See id. at 663. 
 
223 See People v. Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (“In this day of wide 
dissemination of thoughts and messages through transmissions which are vulnerable to 
interception and readable by unintended parties . . . the concept of Internet privacy is a 
fallacy upon which no one should rely.”); see also Stengart, 990 A.2d at 654-55 (noting 
that, as businesses and private citizens increasingly embrace “the use of computers, 
electronic communication devices, the Internet, and e-mail . . . the line separating 
business from personal activities can easily blur.”). 
 
224 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); see also Mark Whitney, Client 
Alert: The Impact of Emerging Technologies on Employee Privacy, MORGAN, BROWN & 
JOY, LLP, 2 (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.morganbrown.com/docs/privacy-
technology%2011-2010.pdf.  
 
225 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625–27. 
 
226 See Whitney, supra note 224, at 3.  See generally Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619. 
 
227 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (“Because the search was reasonable, petitioners did not 
violate respondents’ Fourth Amendment rights . . . ”).   
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The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the 
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology 
before its role in society has become clear.  In Katz, the 
Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to 
conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
a telephone booth.  It is not so clear that courts at present 
are on so sure a ground.  Prudence counsels caution before 
the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-
reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of 
privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using 
employer-provided communication devices.   
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication 
and information transmission are evident not just in the 
technology itself but in what society accepts as proper 
behavior. . . . At present, it is uncertain how workplace 
norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will evolve.228  
 
[56] It is unfortunate that the Court did not take this opportunity to 
provide clearer guidance regarding the proper scope of privacy 
expectations in personal communications at work.  Without such 
guidance, employers will continue to face conflicting law in different 
jurisdictions, and will struggle with establishing policies regarding 
employee communications.   
  
[57] Another area of developing, and thus conflicting law, regards the 
use of social media.229  The need for greater clarity and consistency in this 
area is manifest given the rising prominence of social media websites as 
hubs of our electronic communications.  Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of 
Facebook, recently acknowledged that, “350 million users make use of 
                                                
228 Id. at 2629-30 (citations omitted). 
 
229 See, e.g., Michael Schmidt, A Final Update On The NLRB’s Facebook Firing Case, 
SOC. MEDIA EMP. L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.socialmediaemployment 
lawblog.com/ (“As the law continues to develop, there is no doubt that the intersection of 
social media and employment-related decisions will be crossed again soon in court or an 
administrative agency.”).   
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Facebook messages, sending 4 billion a day.”230  Additionally, an 
estimated 25 billion “tweets” were sent on Twitter in 2010.231  Despite the 
vast amount of information these websites handle, there is no clear 
consensus on the extent to which an individual’s communications are 
protected from disclosure.232  Some courts have allowed discovery of the 
content contained on individuals’ social media pages,233 while others have 
prohibited such disclosure.234   
 
[58] Further complicating matters is the fact that the primary legal 
framework in this area is the Stored Communication Act (“SCA”) 
Congress passed in 1986, when the Internet was still in the earliest stages 
of infancy.235  Given the state of technology at the time Congress drafted 
the SCA, the statute has often proved unfit for the challenges posed by the 
technology of today.236  In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the court’s 
analysis of whether Facebook and Myspace could resist disclosure of user 
                                                
230 Brenna Ehrlich, Facebook Messages by the Numbers, MASHABLE (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://mashable.com/2010/11/15/facebook-messages-numbers/. 
 
231 Internet 2010 in Numbers, PINGDOM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal.pingdom.com/ 
2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/. 
 
232 Compare EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 436 (S.D. Ind. 
2010), with Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
52263 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010). 
 
233 E.g., Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. at 437 (requiring the plaintiff to produce 
content from the individuals’ Facebook pages that was relevant to the lawsuit and limited 
to a specific time period).  
 
234 E.g., Barnes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52263, at *2 (holding that the SCA prohibited 
the disclosure of a non-party witness’ Facebook information). 
 
235 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12); Mark S. Sidoti et al., How Private Is 
Facebook Under the SCA?, L. TECH. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202472886599&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
 
236 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he [SCA] 
was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web.  As a result, the 
existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication.”). 
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content based on the SCA is instructive.237  After engaging in an analysis 
that commentators have described as “legal acrobatics,”238 the court 
concluded that private communications through social media sites were 
protected from disclosure under the SCA, but left open the question of 
whether other information shared through the sites were subject to similar 
protection.239  As the proliferation of the use of social media continues to 
grow, its discovery, and any limitations thereto, will increasingly become 
an issue for litigants.240  To better prepare for the uncertainties 
surrounding the disclosure of content from social networking sites, parties 
should formulate and negotiate ESI discovery protocols in a way that 
addresses how to manage such information at the outset of litigation.241  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
[59] We live in a truly unprecedented era, where information is created 
and distributed in ways that would seem miraculous to prior 
generations.242  This age of information is bringing drastic changes to all 
aspects of our society, and we are only experiencing the very earliest 
stages of those changes.243  With greater information flow, people and 
                                                
237 See generally Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 
238 Sidoti et al., supra note 235. 
 
239 See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991. 
 
240 See Evan North, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social 
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1285-88 (2010). 
 
241 Borden et al., supra note 53. 
 
242 See A Special Report on Managing Information: Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST 
(Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.economist.com/node/15557443/print (stating 
that digital information is expanding exponentially which “makes it possible to do many 
things that previously could not be done”). 
 
243 See id.; Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 
1984?,  25 REV. LITIG. 633, 635–66 (2010) (explaining how technology has had 
widespread effects on society as a whole, and e-discovery in particular).  
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businesses interact more frequently and in a greater variety of forms.244  
The law, at its most fundamental, organizes and prioritizes these 
interactions, and deems certain conduct reasonable and other conduct 
unreasonable.245 The law also determines what information is necessary 
for the proper resolution of disputes.246  
  
[60] The authors of this Article see this process developing in the area 
of e-discovery.  The deluge of data threatens to overwhelm our civil 
justice system, driving the cost of resolving conflicts through that system 
beyond the benefit of doing so.247  The 2006 Amendments were intended 
to help reduce this cost by establishing a framework whereby litigants are 
required to think about what information they have; what information they 
need; openly and transparently discuss those needs with the opposing 
party; and agree on reasonable, iterative, and proportional discovery 
protocols.248  Courts are using the framework of the Amendments to 
reward reasonable conduct and sanction unreasonable conduct, and 
litigants are learning how to work within this new framework.249  By 
doing so, information sufficient to determine the outcome of a matter is 
being discovered and exchanged, while information marginal to that 
determination is more often being excluded.250  This can most effectively 
                                                
244 Cf. Paul & Baron, supra note 6, at ¶ 9 (listing the variety of mediums that have 
become available in recent years, and how they have led to increased communication). 
 
245 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (defining reasonableness in terms of accessibility without 
“undue burden or cost”). 
 
246 Id. (placing various limits on the scope of discovery).    
 
247 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (explaining 
that the overwhelming amount of data that exists “impose[s] costs on an already 
overburdened system and impede[s] the fundamental goal of the ‘just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action’").  
 
248 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 
249 See, e.g., In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 655, 665 (M.D. Fla. 
2007) (applying Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and sanctioning 
a defendant for “fail[ing] to produce ‘usable’ or ‘reasonably accessible’ documents”).  
 
250 See supra Part III.B.  
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be accomplished when an entity establishes a comprehensive information 
governance program that allows it to know the location and content of its 
information.  Once this is known, an entity can more quickly and easily 
determine what happened and why: the fundamental questions of 
litigation.251  This allows parties to lower the cost and expense of civil 
litigation and encourages a revitalization of the primary purpose of our 
civil justice system: “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.”252  
                                                
251 See supra, ¶ 15. This is where the explosion of information is actually helpful, not 
harmful, to the modern litigation process.  The very technology that created the 
information age and the consequent challenges it presents in e-discovery is also the key to 
its solution.  That reality is the next chapter of this story.  
 
252 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
